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Abstract 
 
In this article, we explore the relationship between industrial clusters and social 
upgrading in developing countries. Our article focuses on the hitherto little-considered 
influence of the economic and regulatory environment on the social upgrading of a 
cluster and on its governance system. In doing so, we develop an analytical framework 
that seeks to explain how the enabling environment and different actors in cluster 
governance can either facilitate and/or hinder the process of social upgrading in cluster 
settings in developing countries. Finally, the conclusion outlines our main findings, the 
research and policy implications of our analysis.   
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Globalization is creating new opportunities for developing countries and for industrial 
clusters (Gereffi and Lee, 2014). Industrial clusters are agglomerations of hundreds, 
sometimes thousands, of mostly small enterprises - often co-located with larger firms - in 
similar or related industries, such as footwear, jewelry, or textiles, or in specific services 
or agricultural products (Pyke, 2010).  It is widely believed that their organizational form 
is conducive to raising productivity and incomes amongst member firms, and the 
communities that host them (Nadvi, 1999). This productivity potential is generally 
thought to derive from the collective efficiencies that come from agglomeration, business 
and institutional specialization, access to common goods such as infrastructures and 
specialized labor, knowledge spillovers and opportunities for sharing and collective 
action (Schmitz, 1997; Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi, 2010a). Clusters are ubiquitous, with 
many countries having at least some clusters; and some countries such as India, Brazil 
and China many (Nadvi and Knorringa, 2014).  For the fast growing economies of India 
and China in particular, thousands of industrial clusters are fundamental to their 
development as they bring local economies and small and medium sized firms into 
productive networks, create denser industrial relations, and build up industrial skills 
(Zeng, 2011; Posthuma and Nathan, 2010).       
 
Clusters are connected to the outside world by value chains which link individual firms 
through local, regional, national, and global channels, from raw material extraction to 
retail selling and finally consumers (Mezzadri, 2014). Over the last 20 years, much 
research has been carried out on value chains - and the associated topics of commodity 
chains and global production networks - as enablers and constraints on cluster growth 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002, Schmitz, 2004; Nadvi and Knorringa, 2014). Many 
valuable insights have been made, but these have typically focused on narrow economic, 
business, or inter-firm issues, to the neglect of a range of broader social, community, 
regulatory and local governance aspects (Lund-Thomsen and Pillay, 2012; Puppim and 
Jabbour, 2015).  As a consequence, experts are now beginning to call for the need to 
better integrate social and economic dimensions into cluster and value chain analysis and 
policymaking, and to give greater consideration to the mobilization of labor and 
community assets as determinants of development outcomes (Nadvi, 2007; Puppim de 
Oliveira, 2008; Pyke, 2008; Tewari, 2010; Gulati, 2012; Puppim de Oliveira and Fortes, 
2014; Gereffi and Lee, 2014).   
 
In this article, we focus on the upgrading of social conditions in developing country 
clusters. By good social conditions we mean good employment and income opportunities, 
a high quality in-work employment environment - including fair remuneration, good 
physical environmentally safe working, employment security, an absence of child or 
forced labor, rights of collective representation, and opportunities for social dialogue -, 
and adequate outside of work social protection.i By social upgrading we mean 
improvements in the above social conditions. From an academic perspective, we have 
only recently begun to pay more detailed attention to the role that upgrading of social 
conditions plays in industrial clusters (Awasthi, et al., 2010; Damodaran, 2010).   
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Empirically, the evidence shows that at their most dynamic industrial clusters have been 
capable of exhibiting fast economic growth and creating many jobs.ii For example, the 
Los Lagos salmon cluster in Chile grew its employment by 300% between 1992 and 
2002, and at an annual rate of 13% between 2000 and 2006, by which time total numbers 
employed were 45,000 (UNCTAD, 2006). The Panyu jewelry cluster in China increased 
its employment levels from a very low base to around 70,000 in less than 20 years. The 
Qiaotou buttons cluster and town in China rose in less than 25 years from a small village 
to a community employing 65,000 by 2009. In Brazil, in the late 1980s the Sinos Valley 
footwear cluster employed around 150,000. In India, the Tirrupur textiles cluster grew 
from less than 50,000 jobs in the 1980s to around 400,000 by 2007. In Mexico, the 
Torreon blue jeans cluster rose from 12,000 jobs in 1993 to 75,000 by 1996 (Schmitz, 
1999; Bair and Gereffi, 2001; Nadvi and Barrientos, 2004; Pyke, 2009; UNIDO, 2009).   
 
However, the empirical evidence on clusters and social upgrading also points out that 
there can be significant problems of low pay, poor conditions, and insecurity, especially 
for some workers in small and micro enterprises (Lund-Thomsen, et al., 2014). On the 
one hand, incomes and/or working conditions are said to have risen in clusters such as 
Los Lagos salmon, Chiapas coffee, and Phnom Penn garments (UNCTAD, 2006; 
Damiani, 2008; Parisotto, 2008). On the other hand, wage levels in clusters such as the 
Chennai leather cluster in India, the Sialkot medical instruments cluster in Pakistan, and 
the Sinos Valley footwear cluster in Brazil have been described as “low” (Nadvi and 
Barrientos, 2004). In addition, wages are reported to be low and jobs insecure with few 
extra benefits in the Agra leather cluster in India and widespread social deficits are said to 
exist in the Bangladesh garment industry (Damodaran, 2010; Bell and Newitt, 2010). 
 
The evidence suggests that clusters are capable of generating much economic growth, and 
also many jobs, but that economic growth per se does not guarantee that all, or maybe 
even most, workers will benefit in terms of higher incomes, improved working 
environments and other aspects of good social conditions (Lund-Thomsen et al., 2014). In 
fact, there may be negative externalities from cluster growth processes in particular 
industries (e.g., leather tanning or textiles) such as an increase in occupational health and 
safety risks facing workers or environmental pollution levels affecting local communities 
in which workers and their families reside (Puppim de Oliveira and Jabbour, 2015). That 
is to say, there is no automatic link between economic growth and social upgrading 
(Barrientos et al., 2011; Gereffi & Lee, 2014).  
 
This observation is important because the assumption that there is an automatic causal 
link from economic growth to improved social conditions and reduced poverty appears to 
be prevalent in some policy circles (See, for example, Perry et al., 2006). Moreover, there 
is mounting evidence that for economies generally there can be a reverse direction of 
causality. That is to say, poverty and deficits in social conditions can hinder growth and 
threaten a locking in to a spiral of decline (Perry et al., 2006; Pyke, 2015). Moreover, this 
can be compounded by the nature of price-based competition in clusters that in effect 
promote a cycle of immiserising growth, a situation in which production and exports are 
expanding while the number of jobs and real incomes of the inhabitants in local 
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production areas are declining (Kaplinsky, 2005). In addition, a process of upgrading 
within a cluster may include multiple or conflicting trends whereby some firms are 
upgrading at the expense of others that are downgrading (Posthuma and Nathan, 2010).   
  
Therefore the question is begged: under what conditions might both growth and social 
upgrading occur in industrial clusters in developing countries? To address this question 
this article focuses on the roles of the relatively neglected aspects of a cluster’s economic 
and regulatory enabling environment and its governance system in a developing country 
context. In doing so, we seek to contribute to the embryonic literature on social upgrading 
in industrial clusters in developing countries. For example, Puppim de Oliveira (2008) 
and Puppim de Oliveira and Jabbour (2015) were of the view that social upgrading in 
clusters may be facilitated by voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies, 
through social compliance pressures that cluster-based SMEs may face as part of their 
participation in global value chains, and/or by the enforcement of national labor laws. 
Similarly, Lund-Thomsen et al. (2014) have argued that social upgrading (which the 
authors dub ‘CSR’) may be facilitated/hindered by the presence/absence of strong, well 
enforced labor laws, by independent civil society monitoring, by effective, well-
organized business associations, by organized stakeholder dialogue, and by community-
based corporate accountability strategies.   
 
In this article, we conceptualize how economic growth and social upgrading can either be 
facilitated or constrained by the broader environment in which developing country 
clusters are located, and how the ‘influence’ of the broader environment is mediated by 
the actions of different combinations of key actors involved in local cluster governance.  
 
For the enabling environment, we focus on social, environmental, and quality standards; 
monetary and fiscal policies; and other forms of government regulation. For the cluster 
governance system, we identify key actors as: government, employers’ associations, 
workers’ organizations, and representatives from the communities in which clusters are 
located (see also, Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011). In linking the broader forces in the 
enabling environment to an analysis of the role of key actors in cluster governance, we 
argue that the effects of particular regulations, standards, and policies are mediated by the 
role of the state and key governance actors that may – in different circumstances – either 
contribute to or undermine economic growth and social upgrading within developing 
country industrial clusters.  
 
Our article is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on a cluster’s enabling 
environment, and in particular on how monetary, fiscal, regulatory, and standards policies 
are likely to shape social upgrading (or downgrading) outcomes in developing country 
clusters.  Then, Section 3 highlights the role of different actors in cluster governance in 
shaping social upgrading (or downgrading) outcomes. In Section 4, we move onto 
bringing together the influence of components in the broader enabling environment and 
key actors in cluster governance into an analytical framework that seeks to explain the 
conditions under which social up/downgrading may occur in developing country clusters. 
Section 5 makes some concluding remarks and notes the research and policy implications 
of our analysis.        
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2.0 The Enabling Environment for Social Upgrading in Clusters 
 
Clusters exist in broader monetary, fiscal and regulatory environments emanating from 
various levels of regional, national and international levels of governance.  Such macro 
policies and framework rules are important for influencing the capacity of clusters to 
develop, and in particular whether they do so in ways that encourage economic growth 
and the equitable sharing of the fruits of such growth (Pyke, 2010). We will here look at 
three issues that form central parts of the macro policies or framework rules that facilitate 
and/or constrain social upgrading in developing country industrial clusters. These are 
social, environmental, and quality standards (section 2.1); monetary and fiscal policies 
(section 2.2); and other forms of government regulation (section 2.3).  
   
2.1 Social, environmental, and quality standards  
 
Standards compliance by enterprises in clusters and elsewhere may enable better access 
to high value markets, promote productivity, and allow enterprises to differentiate their 
products from simple commodities (Das, 2014). Many requirements for standards 
compliance have an international origin, emanating from the private sector (often in the 
form of codes of conduct) or from transnational governmental agencies (Nadvi and 
Wältring, 2004).  In Los Lagos, compliance with a range of international hygiene and 
quality standards for farmed fish has been essential for accessing foreign markets 
(UNCTAD, 2006). In Lake Victoria, Kenya, the need for fish farmers to meet European 
hygiene standards was an important premise for market access and a spur to upgrading 
(McCormick, 1998). In Sialkot, Pakistan, demands in the mid-1990s for adherence to 
quality standards in the surgical instruments industry provided the incentive for the 
cluster to upgrade its procedures and may have put it on a higher value-adding path.  
However, failure to address other issues, such as health and safety and child labor, was 
threatening to stop the cluster’s upgrading trajectory and push it down a low quality, low 
price path (Nadvi, 2004). 
 
In Torreon, Mexico, meeting international quality and labor standards was an integral 
part of holding on to contracts with American buyers, leading to improvements in 
working conditions – at least in some plants (Bair and Gereffi, 2001). For the Panyu, 
China, Vicenza, Italy, and other jewelry clusters, the need to adhere to codes of conduct 
was likely to come to the fore in response to the demands of international retailers and 
distributors who have established an ethical sourcing council (Pyke, 2009). In Chiapas, 
Mexico, international norms for organic coffee farming provided, together with the 
promise of access to high value markets, the incentives for a cluster of 1,300 small 
farmers to upgrade their growing practices, and significantly reduced rural poverty. 
Yields increased as did prices obtained (Damiani, 2008). 
 
Private sector codes of conduct coming down international value chains and international 
trade agreements stipulating labor (and other) standards compliance are very important 
and have been much studied (Barrientos and Smith, 2007, Ruwanpura and Wrigley, 2011;  
Egels-Zandén, 2014; Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen, 2014). The consensus view in this 
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literature appears to be that private codes of conduct may be helpful in terms of ensuring 
compliance with “tangible” product standards such as the payment of minimum wages, 
overtime dues, and reducing the number of industrial accidents at production sites. 
However, their ability to address more complex process standards such as freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining has been more circumscribed (ETI 
2006). Moreover, the effects of private codes of conduct beyond first tier suppliers, in 
respect of the latter’s own supply chains of small and micro enterprises is less certain 
(Chan and Nadvi, 2014). 
 
However, a rich and increasingly extensive analytical and empirical literature on 
regulatory renaissance in the context of labor standards and their enforcement in 
particular industries and clusters in the developing world suggests that public regulations 
and public inspections in combination with private regulatory initiatives may under 
certain conditions be more effective in facilitating social upgrading processes in local 
industries than the “isolated” implementation of private codes of conduct (Bartley 2007; 
Pires 2008; Piore and Schrank 2008; Amengual 2010, Levy-Faur, 2010; Locke 2013; 
Coslovsky 2014;  Posthuma and Bignami, 2014). Moreover, findings from this literature 
suggest that combining the enforcement of labor standards with the offer of technical 
assistance to help enterprises comply with regulations in a manner conducive to long term 
competitiveness could be particularly relevant in the context of small enterprises in 
clusters where the opportunities for economic upgrading and challenges related to social 
upgrading are particularly apparent. For example, Pires (2008) argues that (small and 
medium-sized) firms in developing countries often lack the capacity to improve their 
products and production processes. Hence, simply using sanctions against such firms in 
the case of their failing to comply with local labor legislation may be counterproductive. 
Instead, using a combination of sanctions and advice/assistance through the work of local 
labor inspectors is likely to be more effective in ensuring sustained compliance with 
national labor legislation. Posthuma and Bignami (2014), writing in the context of Brazil, 
underscore the above point by arguing that integration into global value chains may form 
the backdrop for national-level labor compliance initiatives undertaken by labor 
legislators working together with local industry associations and firms to find innovative 
ways of enhancing production processes and labor standards compliance simultaneously. 
In contrast, other authors, such as Locke (2013), argue that although public and private 
regulation of labor conditions in local factories could  enhance each other, they could 
alternatively have the opposite effect. Consequently, it is necessary to examine specific 
micro-level processes to understand which public-private regulatory approaches may (or 
may not) work to secure social upgrading. This, they argue, tends to vary across issue 
areas and national contexts.  
 
Even though government labor inspectors can help to enforce standards and raise social 
conditions, often in developing countries this does not happen. This may relate to the 
economic function labor laws are being asked to play. In fact, labor regulations are an 
essential part of all governments’ economic strategies, whether those regulations be 
strong or weak, for example providing workers with strong or alternatively weak 
employment protection. And the readiness or not to enforce labor laws is an inherent part 
of an economic, and related labor regulation, strategy (Pyke, 2015).  
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In general, in recent years there has been a widespread global movement to “deregulate” 
labor markets, with countries providing labor protection sometimes being accused of 
being “anti-competitive” or of providing a poor environment for business (Utting, 2005).  
In such deregulated contexts it might be that the labor regulatory role of the state has 
been understudied by academics, because government might appear to not be doing 
much. Such a conclusion would be mistaken (Piore and Shrank, 2008). In fact, in our 
view, decisions not to promote laws or standards in respect of employment protection, or 
trade union organization, or minimum wages, or not to enforce those labor laws that do 
exist, are in themselves significant regulatory policies which impact on an enterprise’s 
enabling environment.   
 
In some cases the design of robust regulations and their enforcement have been used as 
integral to an economic development strategy. In the case of Germany, over the decades 
after the Second World War, a series of robust labor regulatory measures relating to 
aspects such as collective bargaining, working conditions, and worker dismissal, are 
reported to have acted as a “productivity whip”, preventing enterprises operating on a 
lower wage competitive basis. The institutionalization of strong skills development 
further promoted productivity and functional flexibility, compensating for restrictions on 
use of numerical flexibility or more casual employment practices (Chang et al., 2013).   
 
In other contexts, governments might maintain weak labor regulations or low 
enforcement of those which exist, perhaps in the name of encouraging flexible labor 
markets (Khan and Lund-Thomsen, 2011).  In China, a country where a major element in 
the country’s growth strategy has been the promotion of clusters competing mainly on a 
basis of low cost (often Chinese migrant) labor, “neo-liberal deregulation” in the 1980s 
and especially in the 1990s led to “a dramatic rise in job casualization and labor market 
informalisation” (Chan, 2014).  This movement was enabled by the 1994 Labor Law, 
which, according to Lee (2014), established fixed term contracts as normal. Tenuous 
employment security was accompanied by a situation where social conditions in 
workplaces were often poor, especially for migrants (Chan, 2014), and where labor law 
enforcement was weak, with most local governments reportedly favoring business over 
migrant workers (Li and Freeman, 2014).  Local governments competed with one another 
to lower labor wages and standards in order to attract inward investors, with local 
governments turning ”a blind eye to violations of China’s own labor regulations and 
laws” (Chan, 2003).  Moreover, at the same time migrant workers suffered restrictions on 
their ability to exercise exit strategies by changing employers if they did not like 
conditions, and were prohibited by houkou laws in accessing social benefits (Chan and 
Ross, 2003).  Further, there are doubts about the efficacy of trade unions in China in 
protecting members’ interests, with laws limiting the establishment of independent trade 
unions or the right to strike (Chan, 2003; Chan, 2014; Chan and Nadvi 2014). It seems a 
particular set of labor regulations together with weak enforcement enabled the pursuit of 
an economic strategy of “growth at all costs”, the costs being poor environmental and 
social conditions.    
 
In Pakistan, labor regulations enforcement has also been weak, while successive 
governments have limited, or have actually sought to undermine, the development of 
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trade unions and have done little to promote the spread of labor rights in key export-
industries (Candland, 2007; Shaheed, 2007). In respect specifically of the Sialkot, 
Pakistan, football cluster, government enforcement of labor regulations there has been 
almost totally absent. In fact, during the 2000s, the provincial government of Punjab 
(which incorporates Sialkot) decided to abandon all labor inspections in factories within 
the province (PILER, 2009).   
 
The experiences in Sialkot are reminiscent of what Tendler (2002) calls the “devil’s 
deal”; a situation in which local politicians block the enforcement of labor and 
environmental laws out of their own and local entrepreneurs’ fear that the enforcement of 
these laws may prove very costly for microenterprises and SMEs, driving them out of 
business.  Further, the experiences of Pakistan and China support Pyke’s suggestion that 
governments might decide to pursue a business-first decent work-later strategy, possibly 
seeing good social conditions as costs or inhibitors, or maybe reasoning that the first 
priority is to ensure that businesses thrive and grow – even at a possible trade off cost of 
poor social and environmental conditions (Pyke, 2015).  Consistent with this idea is the 
general absence of social protection issues from cluster and broader economic conceptual 
frameworks as taught in universities (Cichon and Scholz, 2009).  An alternative to the 
business-first decent work-later view is to see social protection, and good social 
conditions generally, as crucial inputs to productivity and long term growth.  This would 
be very much in line with the argument of Locke and Romis (2007) and Locke (2013) 
that posits that reorganizing production organization and employment practices in export-
oriented factories might both help in increasing productivity and improving work 
conditions. In the “decent work first” view, good social conditions including social 
protection are not luxuries; they are investments and important enabling conditions for 
productive growth (Pyke, 2015). 
  
2.2 Monetary and fiscal policies    
 
Fiscal policies comprise both public revenues as raised through taxation, and 
expenditures as expressed in the government budget.  How much the state should spend 
and on what, how and from where it should raise tax revenues, or how much it should cut 
back on and where, can have profound employment, welfare, and growth implications 
(Easterly, 1993). Taxation and subsidy policies might not only have an immediate direct 
effect on social upgrading, in the sense that people might immediately have more (or less) 
money to spend on their wellbeing. Such policies can also have very important indirect 
effects on the capacity of clusters, and the broader economy, to raise productivity and to 
be able to afford higher standards. This indirect effect can occur in different forms, such 
as, for example, when government targets tax rebates or subsidies at particular clusters 
conditional upon investments in productivity raising machinery or perhaps in scientific 
research, or to encourage investment that fills gaps in the value chain (Pyke, 2010).   
 
In China, in the case of the Xiqiao textiles cluster the local government has had a goal of 
completing the cluster by filling in upstream and downstream gaps in the local value 
chain, to which end inward investment has been encouraged by various means that 
include fiscal incentives such as exemptions from business tax for the first two years, 
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followed by reduced rates for three years (Wang and Yue, 2010).  Fiscal policy can also 
indirectly affect cluster growth and social standards when cutbacks in public spending on 
social protection increase poverty and thereby risk reducing capacities for learning, 
threaten health, or reduce investments by the self-employed in equipment, all of which 
are likely over time to undermine a cluster’s aggregate levels of productivity. Moreover, 
decisions to reduce social expenditures or raise taxes can have important implications for 
economic demand and thereby the capacity for businesses to sell their wares (Pyke, 
2015). 
 
Monetary policy is also highly significant and includes policy on interest rates, exchange 
rates and money supply (Easterly, 1993). The money supply is important for maintaining 
or boosting aggregate demand (and thereby jobs), while interest rates affect lending.  
International exchange rates can be particularly significant for exporting clusters (in that 
they lower export prices), and also potentially for encouraging increases in productivity 
(such as by maintaining a high exchange rate which makes it less easy to raise 
competitiveness by simply devaluing the currency) (Pyke, 2010).  Managing the money 
supply, interest rates, and exchange rates are important government tools (Blanchard, 
2012). In the cluster context, a tendency by researchers to focus on micro issues has 
meant that the roles of monetary and fiscal policies in cluster development have not been 
strongly researched, but, nevertheless, some important insights exist (Pyke, 2010).  For 
example, in the case of the Sinos Valley footwear cluster (Schmitz, 1998;1999), one of 
the factors that made business difficult in the 1990s was the effect of government anti-
inflationary policies in pushing up the value of the Brazilian currency and so making 
exporting more difficult. In Italy, the introduction of a fixed exchange rate for the Euro in 
the 1990s removed access to a traditional Italian strategy of promoting exports through 
Lire devaluation, and may, together with other conditions, have encouraged outsourcing 
abroad. Equally, the removal of the devaluation mechanism might have encouraged 
Italy’s clusters to seek out more productive and higher value adding ways of 
manufacturing (Tattara, 2010).    
 
For China, a low exchange rate for the renminbi vis-a-vis the US dollar and the European 
Euro may have benefited the country’s export oriented clusters (Pyke, 2010).  In Mexico, 
the appreciation of the Peso and subsequent increases in import costs contributed to the 
decline of the Chipilo furniture cluster (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2004), while an earlier 
depreciation of the peso is reported to have played a part in helping the Guadalajara shoe 
cluster (Rabelloti, 1999). In Pakistan, despite significant monetary devaluation (following 
a decision to adhere to a floating exchange rate) exports from the (strongly export 
oriented) football cluster in Sialkot did not increase, and indeed the consequences of such 
monetary policy for an industry strongly reliant on imported raw materials might have 
been higher costs and reduced competitiveness, while imported consumer goods for 
workers might also have been pricier (Afraz et al., 2014). Moreover, Pakistan has 
experienced sustained inflation over the last decade which has contributed to eroding the 
real wages of many workers, especially hand-stitchers, in the Sialkot football 
manufacturing cluster (Lund-Thomsen, 2013).   
 
2.3 Other forms of government regulation  
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Inside national borders, government regulation may address common issues which affect 
cluster and non-cluster contexts alike, such as respect for property rights and the rule of 
contract law (Pyke, 2010). There may also be specific policies and regulations tailored to 
the particular needs and upgrading strategies of individual clusters, such as the provision 
of import and export controls for particular products, materials or technologies; place of 
origin regulations and targeted tariffs.  The subject of tariffs is particularly controversial. 
Some argue they might protect inefficient industries and reduce the incentive to raise 
productivity levels, while possibly raising import costs for crucial components or 
consumer durables. In consequence, economic growth and employment expansion could 
be reduced while real living costs might rise (Kaplinsky, 2005).  In contrast, others argue 
that targeted tariffs can be an important tool for protecting infant industries against 
(temporarily) more advanced competitors, without which local businesses and jobs might 
be destroyed. The strategic use of tariffs for particular inputs or outputs, possibly 
changing over time, and possibly differing for part products and complete products, can 
provide incentives, and, when needed, valuable protection. Developing countries in 
particular are thought to potentially benefit from an appropriate tariffs policy (Tewari and 
Pillai, 2005).  
 
In practice, some forms of regulation appear to have been particularly significant for the 
growth of clusters. These include both tariffs and intra-regional outsourcing rules (Pyke, 
2010). For example, some clusters have developed subsequent to the formulation of 
regional regulatory frameworks that favour outsourcing, such as the Blue Jeans cluster in 
Torreon, Mexico (Bair and Gereffi, 2001). As for tariffs, in Guadalajara, Mexico, 
protectionist measures, along with monetary action to devalue the peso, appear to have 
helped the cluster revive (Rabellotti, 1999). In India, export-oriented clusters, in 
particular, have operated in the context of an array of regulatory constraints and 
incentives (Tewari and Pillai, 2005).  This has been the case, for example for the textiles 
and garment clusters of Kannur and Tirupur.  In the case of the Chennai, India, auto-
cluster, it has been asserted that state incentives such as tax cuts, easy acquisition of land, 
and speedy project implementation have been instrumental in attracting inward 
investment (Bhargau, 2012).  In China, various regulations, tariffs, subsidies, import 
quotas and other incentives such as local content requirements have been used by national 
and local governments and have formed an important background to cluster development. 
For example, in respect of the automobile industry protective tariff rates for imported 
vehicles reached 200% in the 1980s, and 80-100% in the 1990s, falling to 25% by 2006. 
In the early 2000s subassemblies were given the same tariff as entire vehicles with the 
aim of encouraging vehicle manufacturers to increase the localisation of assemblies and 
parts (Oliver et al., 2009). 
 
In sum, the examples above have shown how monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies 
may contribute significantly to a cluster’s enabling environment and as such have 
important consequences for economic growth prospects and whether that growth is 
accompanied by the upgrading of social conditions.  Influences on the environment have 
been shown to emanate from both national and international sources, while the content of 
policies and regulations might be shaped by the conceptual economic growth 
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frameworks, ideologies, and beliefs employed by policymakers. However, the effects of 
the enabling environment on economic growth and social conditions might not 
necessarily be direct, to the extent that there is mediation by the actions of cluster 
governance actors.  That is to say, the enabling environment creates an important context 
which incentivises, facilitates or constrains, but actual outcomes may depend on the 
actions of cluster actors.   
 
The roles of key governance actors and how they affect prospects for economic growth 
and social upgrading in the context of specific policy and regulatory environments is the 
subject of the next section. 
    
3.0 Key Actors in Local Cluster Governance for Social Upgrading 
 
The array of representative organizations, institutions, businesses, and government, and 
the way they interact and orient towards a cluster, constitute a governance system. Such a 
system is key to cluster growth and upgrading strategies (Pyke, 2010). In this section  we 
discuss the role of government, employers’ associations, workers’ organizations, and 
community organizations in the promotion of economic growth and social upgrading 
within developing country industrial clusters. 
 
3.1 Government 
Government or the state has a crucial role to play in cluster development.  One of its most 
important roles is the enacting of legislation and formulation of policies, including the 
enforcement or not of regulations, which serve to contribute to a cluster’s enabling 
environment, as described in Section 2. Government and its agencies also may provide a 
range of public services, ranging from advice on technologies, to information on markets 
and international regulatory requirements, to provision of transport and infrastructural 
facilities.  
Government can also be the facilitator of joint action. To effectively address a broad 
development agenda it might be necessary to bring together an array of public and 
private, both local and global, actors. It is through such multi-stakeholder initiatives that 
various inputs can be effectively integrated into a growth and upgrading strategy (Lund-
Thomsen and Nadvi, 2010b). Government - especially local or regional government – can 
act to facilitate social dialogue and partnership amongst stakeholders. For this, top down 
bureaucratic practices may be replaced by decentralized facilitating ones (Pyke, 2010).  
 
In the case of the Sinos Valley footwear cluster in Southern Brazil, the potential for 
government to act to promote cluster governance was implied when it was noted that 
there was a crucial failure on the part of government to facilitate collaboration and 
consensus amongst key associations behind a new cluster-wide upgrading strategy, 
known as the “Shoes from Brazil Programme” (Schmitz, 1999). In the 1980s, the Sinos 
Valley shoe cluster had grown to over 1,000 shoe manufacturers and sub-contractors, 
plus a full range of supply industries including tanneries, component makers, and 
machinery manufacturers, providing in total jobs for around 150,000 people.  In the 
1990s growth slowed down. “The Shoes from Brazil Program” was an attempt by five 
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employers’ associations to engage in joint action to develop a cluster wide strategy for 
upgrading, and move away from a dependency on price competition.  This included 
targeting new markets, raising the image of “Made in Brazil”, eradicating child labor, 
joint participation in fairs, and creating a local design capacity (Schmitz, 1998).  
However, the program did not materialize because of conflicts of interest.  In particular, 
certain leading enterprises had an interest in allying with a powerful major international 
customer, rather than with the rest of the cluster.  Even so, the program might still have 
been saved if government authorities had not failed to mediate and promote an upgrading 
consensus. The failure of  “The Shoes from Brazil Program” put back the prospects of the 
cluster growing by moving away from labor-intensive export manufacturing and 
differentiating itself from international competitors (Schmitz, 1999). 
 
3.2 Employers Organizations 
 
Employers’ organizations exist first and foremost to promote their members’ interests.  
Their actions might include combining together to regulate wage rates and social 
conditions, possibly through negotiation with trade unions, and/or in a context where 
cutthroat competition would otherwise break out.  In China, faced with very high labour 
turnover and workers’ unrest in response to alleged late payment of wages and perceived 
cheating on wages, enterprises in the woollen sweater cluster in Wenling City, Zhejiang, 
sought to set standard rates through their sectoral employers association in negotiation 
with local trade unions (Lee, 2013). In Sialkot, Pakistan, an employers’ association 
played a key role in the development and implementation of the multi-stakeholder 
initiative combating child labour in the football cluster known as the Atlanta Agreement, 
which led to social upgrading and also helped firms in the cluster access key markets.  
But then the association also made sure that calls from Western NGOs and brands for a 
broad introduction of labour rights for home-based football stitchers, such as full-time 
contracts, minimum wages, overtime payments, and social protection, were not 
implemented (A. Khan, 2007).  
 
Employers may also combine together, possibly collaborating in public-private 
partnerships and/or with other organizations such as trade unions or community 
associations, to engage in joint cluster growth or productivity raising activities (Schmitz 
and Nadvi, 1999).  In many cluster studies groups of employers, often organized into 
associations, have been cited as being active, providing members with services, engaging 
in joint enterprise activities, partnering with the public sector, and representing members’ 
interests at various levels of government (Nadvi and Barrientos, 2004).  In Sialkot, action 
by an entrepreneurial association, with public support, resulted in a surgical instruments 
cluster achieving crucial international quality standards which enabled it to retain 
important markets, and may have helped it move along an upgrading path and avert going 
down a low quality, low cost route (Nadvi, 1999). As a result of this action, the vast 
majority of SMEs in the cluster were able to comply with international standards, so 
averting a situation where most small firms would have had to close given that the United 
States and the European Union accounted for over 90% of the cluster’s sales (Nadvi and 
Barrientos, 2004).      
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In India, the Tirupur Exporters Association (TEA) has (in 2013) 720 knitwear exporters 
as registered members. TEA is involved in arranging buyer-seller meetings and 
international fairs for SMEs, helps SMEs access financial assistance, and provides 
members with a range of information. TEA has also been involved in a series of 
infrastructure projects, including the Tirupur Export Knitwear Complex, an Inland 
Container Depot, the TEA Knitwear Fashion Institute, the TEATEX Processing and 
Production Centre, and the TEA Public School (SupportBiz, 2013). In Mexico, the 
Chiapas Organic Coffee Cluster is notable for the leading role of a farmer’s association in 
mediating between buyers and farmers, and providing a range of services (Damiani, 
2008). In Los Lagos, collective initiatives by an entrepreneurial association and also by 
public-private partnerships have been central to the salmon cluster’s growth (UNCTAD, 
2006). Employers’ associations have also been noted as being particularly active in the 
Riviera del Brenta footwear cluster in Italy; and the Guadalajara footwear cluster in 
Mexico (Rabellotti, 1999; 2001; 2003). In contrast, in some cases, such as in Sialkot, 
Chipilo, Lake Victoria, and Sinos Valley, failure to act collectively on key issues is said 
to have threatened further development (McCormick, 1998; Schmitz, 1999; Nadvi, 1999; 
Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2004). 
Employers organizations at various local, national, and international levels might also 
seek to influence policies and regulations legislation.  For example, in the case of China,  
moves towards legislating for collective bargaining were opposed, with some effect, by 
employers associations in Hong Kong and by chambers of commerce in the U.S.A. 
(Chan, 2014). Within countries, employers’ associations might participate, possibly 
alongside workers’ organizations and others, in national consultative committees set up to 
advise governments in particular policy areas.   
3.3 Workers Organizations   
 
The role of labor and labor organizations has received much less attention in cluster 
research and analysis (Das, 2005). But in fact labor organizations can have a big 
influence on a cluster’s trajectory. In cluster settings, a new literature has recently 
emerged to describe how workers are able to influence their conditions at work (Carswell 
and De Neve, 2013). This is the literature on labor agency in industrial clusters which 
understands “agency” in two different ways. First, labor agency may be conceived in the 
sense of the use of “voice” through collective labor organizations such as trade unions 
that directly seek to influence employers, mostly in formal sector enterprises, through the 
use of collective bargaining and freedom of association strategies (Lund-Thomsen, 2013). 
Second, labor agency has also been understood as the ability of workers to influence 
working conditions through their choice of occupation and employment decision, 
engaging in “entry” and “exit” strategies, for example, by exercising their choice of 
employers to work for (Coe and Hess, 2013).  
 
However, we can suggest that the actual ability of workers to affect their conditions in 
clusters or elsewhere through voice and exit strategies will depend on the labor regulatory 
environment in respect of factors such as the ease of trade union organization, or the 
ability to engage in strike action, or in respect of employment security legislation, 
minimum wage setting, or unemployment protection (Posthuma and Nathan, 2010). Also 
the quantity of labor available in the market for particular job positions matters when it 
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comes to the efficacy of exit strategies.  At times of labor shortage workers’ bargaining 
power increases and, as happened in China in recent years, the exercise of “voice” and 
collective action is encouraged (Chan and Nadvi, 2014).  Moreover, simply the threat of 
worker exit can be enough to induce employers to offer better pay and conditions. 
Equally, a labor surplus can act to dampen wages and conditions. Further, a plethora of 
cheap flexible labor might encourage employers to focus on price competitive strategies, 
reducing the incentive to raise productivity through better work organization, higher 
value products and greater technological investment (Pyke, 2015).  
   
An example of a workers’ collective action affecting cluster outcomes is that of the 
frequent trade union led strikes in the early 1970s amongst stitchers in the Sialkot, 
Pakistan, football cluster, where the aim was to improve conditions in the factories. In 
response, the Sialkot-based football entrepreneurs decided to transfer the process of 
football stitching out of the factories and into workers’ houses (F. Khan, 2007). Hence, as 
a result of this move, a subcontracting system involving thousands of contractors (mainly 
former factory-based workers) and a new labor force consisting of thousands of home-
based male, female, and child workers was institutionalized in the cluster (Lund-
Thomsen, 2013). The structure and character of the cluster was fundamentally changed. 
 
This decentralisation and reorganisation of the football cluster had important implications 
for social conditions. On the one hand, there was increasing access for female home-
based football stitchers who were able to increase their earnings while simultaneously 
take care of their household and child rearing duties (F. Khan, 2004). On the other hand, 
home-based football stitchers were not formally recognized as workers under Pakistani 
labour law. Hence, they had no right to minimum wages, overtime payments, and social 
insurance in general (Lund-Thomsen 2013). At the same time, a large number of child 
workers came to be involved in football stitching as a way of supporting their poor 
parents’ income (A. Khan, 2007). While this trend was later partly reversed as a result of 
the multi-stakeholder Atlanta Agreement that significantly reduced the number of 
children involved in football stitching in Sialkot, football stitchers labouring in the 
stitching centres and home-based units in Sialkot continue to be denied any meaningful 
form of labour rights to this date (Lund-Thomsen et al., 2012).   
 
Consequently, while it might be argued that trade union militancy failed in its original 
objectives, it cannot be said that worker action (and employer reaction) was without 
effects.  In the longer term, the cluster would as a consequence of the decentralisation 
face the negative repercussions of consumer objections to child labour, while a 
continuing problem of low technological investment and low productivity would remain 
to be solved.      
 
Trade unions cannot only act to protect wages and conditions, whether through collective 
bargaining or through the pressure of threatening strike action; they can also actively 
campaign for competitive strategies consistent with rising standards (Coe and Jordhus-
Lier, 2011). They can act in partnership with employers’ organizations, government and 
others in local jobs pacts and in the promotion of productivity improvements and value 
adding development strategies that help to move enterprises away from price driven 
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cheap labor strategies (Posthuma and Nathan, 2010). Unions can also become specifically 
engaged in training and in encouraging workplace learning.  In Italy, Emilia Romagna is 
a region with an economy characterized by industrial clusters. In the 1990s the “Standing 
Conference of Economy and Labor” was established in order to promote dialogue 
amongst employers and trade union organizations in respect of the region’s general 
development aims and to encourage them to participate in strategic decision making 
(Cossentino, 1996). In the USA, the Garment Industrial Development Corporation 
(GIDC) is an intermediary institution established to help New York’s cluster of garment 
manufacturers compete along higher value adding lines. Trade unions joined employers’ 
organizations and government on the supervisory board of GIDC, which carried out a 
range of measures such as promoting fast response, fashion consciousness and training 
(Fashion & Sourcing Network, 2014). 
 
3.4 Community Organizations   
 
Community organizations cover a broad range of economic and social associations,  
including various forms of self-help organizations and associations catering for informal 
sector groups, the self-employed, and micro-entrepreneurs. These important economic 
actors not generally represented by formal employers and trade union organizations. Non-
government organizations, religious groups, housing associations, women’s groups, 
youth organizations, and ad hoc groups formed for specific purposes such as to combat an 
environmental threat might also be included under this heading (Pyke, 2010).    
 
The role of community organizations in cluster competitiveness, participation in local 
governance structures, and contributions to growth has been badly neglected in cluster 
research and policy recommendations. However, clusters do not exist in isolation but are 
hosted by specific communities. This is something that was recognized in the 1980s and 
1990s by ILO research into clusters or “industrial districts” in Italy, which were explicitly 
recognized as socio-economic phenomena (See, for example, Pyke et al., 1990). 
Moreover, there is good reason to argue that if the use of the concept of social upgrading 
tends to relate to conditions in the world of employment it nevertheless ought to also 
encompass community conditions. This is because in practice the worlds of employment 
and community life often overlap, especially, perhaps, in developing countries (Coe and 
Jordhus-Lier, 2011). 
 
The overlapping of the social, community and economic spheres occurs on various 
dimensions.  For example, in developing countries especially, much work is carried out in 
the home and so physical living conditions impact on working productivity (Pyke, 2009). 
Moreover, financially, micro-entrepreneurs might not differentiate between money and 
bills pertaining to living costs and those pertaining to running a small or micro enterprise, 
meaning that depletions in one deplete the other. This highlights the importance of the 
role of social protection as not just a defender of living standards but also as a contributor 
to, or safeguard of, capital needed for small scale activities, and thereby to aggregate 
economic growth (Pyke, 2015).     
 
The community environment also might matter when it comes to decisions where to 
establish new businesses or in which locations to look for work, as a source of consumer 
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demand for the products of business, and for participation in labor markets (Carswell and 
De Neve, 2013).  Poverty in the community can have significant implications for 
educational and training attainment, human capital embellishment, and in the long term 
for aggregate economic growth (Perry et al., 2006). Labour market participation is 
influenced by factors such as the availability of social protection, child care facilities, and 
various cultural inducements or inhibitors. Overall, community conditions have the 
nature of a public good, the effects of which are long term and developmental in nature 
(Lund-Thomsen, 2013). 
   
A substantial amount has been written about the relevance of community organizations, 
and the social context more generally, for social cohesion, for enabling inter-firm 
collaboration, and for encouraging good industrial relations inside the firm (see, for 
example, Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994).  Research in Italy reported that social relationships 
outside the enterprise influenced the attitudes workers brought to work in the industrial 
districts or clusters of Emilia Romagna, and determined whether they would “give of 
their best” to make the enterprise a success. Strong social and economic disparities 
undermine social cohesion and a readiness to work in partnership. Strains may 
particularly surface at times of economic crisis and rising unemployment (Brusco, 1996). 
 
However, little has been written about community representative organizations as active 
agents and potential contributors to a cluster governance system.  An exception has been 
where the more active governance role for community organizations has been described 
in the few works which refer to “cluster committees”.  These are committees which 
encompass a range of interest groups, such as educational establishments, housing 
associations, trade associations and more, and which address both enterprise and 
community issues.  For example, a District (Cluster) Committee was established to serve 
the Manzano chair industrial district (cluster) in North East Italy (Pyke, 2003). Other 
community focused actions by organizations involved in clusters are beginning to be 
written about. Tewari (2010) reports on an NGO working with an SME association to 
provide crèches for women working in small firms in garment clusters around Chennai; 
while in the garment clusters in Bengaluru, the New Trade Union Initiative has been 
partnering with a non-profit organization to reorganize laundry facilities in the 
community for garment workers already working long hours in factories.  More 
generally, Holgate (2014) refers to a growing trend for community organizations to work 
alongside or in coalition with trade unions, pursuing issues such as living wages or green 
jobs.  
   
In this section we have shown that cluster governance actors play crucial roles in 
facilitating or hindering economic growth and social upgrading, and for this they mediate 
the effects of policies and regulations.  In many of the examples highlighted it is clear 
that the actions taken were explicitly or implicitly influenced – incentivized, facilitated, 
or constrained – by the enabling environment. Thus, for example, we saw governments 
might leverage weak labor standards and/or weak enforcement to pursue cheap labor 
competitive strategies, as happened in China. Or employers might collaborate with one 
another to respond to government fiscal incentives to introduce new technologies, or 
outsource to production units less covered by labor regulations, or collaborate with other 
stakeholders to address a specific standards challenge such as the international 
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requirement expressed in Sialkot to eradicate child labor.  And it was seen that workers’ 
capacity to use collective “voice” or individual “exit” strategies depends on the existence 
of an enabling regulatory environment – such as legislation permitting independent trade 
unions and/or the right to strike, and that community organizations’ ability to voice their 
concerns might be improved if the government creates institutions such as cluster 
committees. 
 
4.0  Towards an Analytical Framework 
 
Our findings that both the enabling environment and the actions of cluster governance 
actors are important for economic growth and social upgrading imply that these 
influences should be part of an analytical framework. This section proposes the outlines 
of such a framework, one that allows for variability in the enabling environment and the 
influences on it, and also differences in the participation of cluster governance actors and 
how they mediate the effects of policies and regulations. See figure 1, below. 
 
Figure 1: The Influence of the Enabling Environment and Cluster 
Governance on Cluster Growth and Social Conditions 
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In figure 1, we show a cluster’s capacity to grow and provide good social conditions 
being affected by the actions of governance actors, and also by the cluster’s economic 
and regulatory enabling environment. The enabling environment is then also shown to be 
subject to both national and international influences. We suggest that various 
combinations of differing environments, influences on those environments, sets of 
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governance actors, and how those actors mediate the effects of policies and regulations, 
form the key components of our analytical framework. 
 
a) The Enabling Environment 
The enabling environment includes a range of monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies, 
some of which have been formulated specifically for particular sectors or clusters, and 
some of which are of a more general kind affecting all parts of an economy. The 
identification of the components of the enabling environment and how they might relate 
to a cluster’s prospects for growth and social conditions is an essential part of an 
explanatory framework.  In this, a distinction might be drawn between socially protective 
aims of policies and regulations (such as protecting the environment, or people’s health, 
or people’s rights), and economic aims as when policies and regulations have the function 
of promoting particular growth strategies such as using minimum wage legislation to 
raise labor costs in order to incentivize greater productivity, or introducing tariff policies 
to protect infant industries, or raising social protection levels in order to expand consumer 
demand, or devaluing currencies to expand exports. Particular ideologies, theories, or 
beliefs driving the policies and regulations could be taken into account.   
 
b) Influencers on the Enabling Environment 
It is also important to understand the possibly multiple sources of policies and regulations 
influencing the enabling environment, some of which are domestic while others might be 
international in origin.  Important international influencers could include, for example: 
supra-national political authorities such as the European Union or the North American 
Free Trade Area; private sector codes in respect of quality, hygiene, labor, environmental, 
or other aspects; international employers and workers associations and transnational 
collective bargaining agreements; international trade agreements; and pressures or rules 
coming from international institutions and agencies, such as the International Labor 
Organisation, the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, 
international development banks, and international non-government organizations. The 
extent to which enterprises in clusters will be subject to such external influences will 
differ, but in a globalised world, and the fact that many clusters are export oriented, 
means that external international pressures (to raise or lower standards) could be 
significant.   
 
c) The Role of  Cluster Governance Actors  
The actual efficacy of policies and regulations will depend on how they are mediated by 
cluster governance actors, amongst which we have highlighted: government and its 
agencies; employers’ organisations; trade unions; and community organisations.  Labour 
regulations, for example, may be enforced or not enforced, and if there is enforcement it 
may occur in different ways.  Government officials might be competent or not, corrupt or 
not, ready to advise on best ways of implementation or not.  Community organisations, 
such as self-employed associations might advise members on, and/or use government 
subsidies to assist members on, issues such as housing/homework conditions, childcare, 
education, small business activities, and more.  Similarly, the achievement of quality 
standards might be achieved by enterprises one by one, or as part of collective efforts 
between an employers’ association and a training institute.  Fiscal incentives to introduce 
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new technologies again might be responded to on an individual basis or, alternatively, be 
the subject of a collective bargaining process between a cluster employers’ association 
and a trade union. In short, governance actors, acting alone or in combination, play 
important parts in a cluster’s prospects for growth and good social conditions, with the 
enabling environment acting as a crucial incentivisor or facilitator of, or constraint on, 
behaviour.  
 
In any specific cluster there will occur particular configurations of national and 
international influences on the enabling environment - resulting in particular types of 
policies and regulations -, and actions by cluster governance bodies, either individually or 
in combination with others. Our analytical framework encompasses the variability that 
might occur amongst clusters and so act to help explain different consequences for 
economic growth and social conditions. 
 
5.0   Conclusions and Policy Implications 
   
In this article, we sought to make a contribution to the literature on social upgrading in 
industrial clusters in developing countries. Our review of the literature indicates that 
clusters are capable of growing strongly and providing many jobs, but that is not always 
the case, and neither is it necessarily the case that clusters, growing or not, are 
accompanied by good social conditions.    
 
Our key question has been under what conditions will economic growth occur in such a 
way that it is accompanied by social upgrading? Our review has indicated, first, the 
importance of the role played by the cluster environment, and second, the importance of 
the key actors in cluster governance. The effects of the policies and regulations of the 
enabling environment are mediated by the actions of the governance actors, who find 
themselves incentivized, enabled, or constrained in their behavior, while the actors, 
especially government, are also involved in setting policies and regulations that create 
that environment. 
 
Our review has found that monetary, fiscal, and social policies and regulations, on the 
one hand, and the actions of governance actors, on the other, are important for cluster 
growth and social upgrading.  Hitherto, the influence on clusters and social upgrading of 
international sources has been documented, but surprisingly little research has been 
carried out on the effects of national policies and regulations – albeit that recent interest 
in a regulatory renaissance has focused some attention on government labor inspection 
practices. Moreover, in the cluster context, relatively little attention has been paid to the 
effects of a range of governance actors, with research on the influence of trade unions and 
community associations being particularly absent.           
 
However, key actions are taken locally, and in this employers organizations, trade unions, 
community actors, and government play important roles. Of these, possibly government 
is of particular importance in that it is responsible for setting regulatory framework rules 
which are likely to affect more than those established by international players.  In fact, it 
might be argued that some international rule setting, such as private sector codes of 
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conduct, might not be necessary, or at least less necessary, if national regulations were 
robust and adequately enforced.  But, as we showed, national labor codes vary, and the 
degree of their enforcement also varies.   
 
Our findings suggest that the content of national labor codes and how they are enforced 
might be related to the particular economic conceptual frameworks being used by 
government, and how the role of social conditions fit in.  Often government behavior 
seems to be consistent with the assumption that policies (including regulations) should 
firstly promote business and then later social conditions, or even diminish social 
conditions in order to promote business growth. We can speculate that clusters competing 
on a cheap labor, price-driven basis may be particularly likely recipients of this approach. 
An alternative view would be to see poor social conditions as inhibitors of long-term 
sustainable growth on a basis of science, knowledge and technology, productivity 
enhancement, value adding, or differentiation. 
 
One important policy implication is that those wishing to see good social conditions 
integrated into economic promotion strategies might first and foremost need to persuade 
national and regional governments of the wisdom of that approach.  This implies a need 
both for more research demonstrating a positive relationship between good social 
conditions and business and broader economic growth, and also the development of 
convincing conceptual socio-economic frameworks that can guide government policy 
making.   
 
For the future, we suggest researchers should study the roles of the key components we 
have highlighted, using the analytical framework proposed in Section 4. Perhaps 
particular attention should be paid to the role of the state as key formulator of the cluster 
environment, and to the conceptual frameworks that guide its policies.  Where do social 
considerations fit into their frameworks?  Are good social conditions seen as inhibitors to 
business growth or long term enablers? 
 
                                                          
iOur definition is very similar to that of the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) decent work concept.  
For example, Posthuma and Nathan, 2010, refer to decent work as: “a concept which promotes 
opportunities for productive work and fair remuneration, with social protection and under conditions of 
safety in the workplace and having the freedom to organise and participate in the decisions that affect their 
lives”.  Other sources, including references to the ILO’s “decent work agenda”, imply a slightly broader 
definition, including  qualities such as employment security (ETUC, 2007; ILO 2015a), an absence of child 
or forced labour, and aspects of working conditions such as rest periods and opportunities for personal 
improvement through skills development (ILO, 2015a; ILO, 2015b).  We include all the above components 
in our definition. 
 
iiIn terms of quantitative outcomes, there are clearly some clusters which have been relatively stagnant, 
have hardly grown, and have created relatively few jobs.  For example, in Africa, the Enugu furniture 
clusters in Nigeria have experienced limited growth and only employ about 700 people (Uzor, 2004); and 
the Eastlands garment cluster in Kenya only employs about 2,000 (McCormick, 1998).  
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